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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Cour t i m p r o p e r l y h e l d t h a t 
p l a i n t i f f s ' medical malpractice act ion was not commenced within 
the s t a tu t e of l imi t a t i ons set forth in §§78-14-4 and 78-14-8, 
Utah Code Ann., (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a medical malpractice action in which 
Plaintiffs have alleged that their infant daughter's neurological 
problems were caused by Defendants' negligence in the delivery of 
their child. Plaintiffs appeal from a final judgment entered in 
the lower court dismissing this action on the grounds that this 
action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 
§§78-14-4 and 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This action was clearly filed within the time periods 
and in accordance with the requirements of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, U.C.A., 1953, 78-14-1 et seq., and therefore, 
the lower court erred in dismissing this action. 
The lower court's interpretation and application of the 
relevant provisions of the Act is erroneous since it directly 
contravenes well established principles of statutory 
construction and the plain language of the statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts, which are not disputed by any of the 
parties, are as follows: 
1. This is a "malpractice action against a health care 
provider" as that phrase is defined in §78-14-3(29). [Complaint 
at Record on Appeal at p. 2. See also, Defendants' Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities, Record on Appeal at p. 23.] 
2. The dates of the alleged "act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence", for the purposes of §78-14-4 was between February 
28, 1981 and March 1, 1981, inclusive. [See, "Notice of Intent 
to Commence Action (attached as Addendum B hereto), Record on 
Appeal at p. 30. See also, Defendants' Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, Record on Appeal at p. 23.] 
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3. The date of discovery of the "injury", for the 
purposes of §78-14-4 was between November 21, 1982 and December 
1, 1982, inclusive. [Affidavit of Chris S. Forbes (Addendum D 
hereto)/ Record on Appeal at p. 77. See also, Notice of Intent 
to Commence Action (Addendum B hereto), Record on Appeal at p. 
30.] 
4. The Notice of Intent to File a Malpractice Action, 
required by §78-14-8, was served by certified mail on November 
20, 1984. [Affidavit of James G. Clark, Esq. (Adendum E hereto), 
Record on Appeal at p. 74, and Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action (Addendum B hereto), Record on Appeal at p. 30.] 
5. This malpractice action was commenced on March 12, 
1985. [Clerk's stamp on original, filed Complaint (Addendum F 
hereto), Record on Appeal at p. 2; £££ fLJLiLS' Rule 3(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.] 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SET 
FORTH IN §§78-14-4 AND 78-14-8, 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended.) 
Subject to the extensions granted under §78-14-8, §78-
14-4 establishes the time period in which a malpractice action 
must be commenced. The relevant section of §78-14-4 provides 
as follows: 
1. No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of 
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reasonable diligence should have discoverd the 
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to 
exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence... 
[The complete text of §78-14-4 is annexed hereto 
as Addendum A.] 
The "applicable" limitation period is the first to 
expire of the two alternative periods under §78-14-4; either two 
years from discovery, or four years from the date of the alleged 
malpractice. 
In Foil vs. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (1979) this court 
held that discovery occurs when the injured person knows or 
should have known that he has suffered legal injury. In this 
action the plaintiffs discovered that the injury sustained by 
their daughter may have been caused by negligence on or about 
November 27, 1982 upon consulting medical personel at Primary 
Childrens Hospital. [Affidavit of Chris Forbes, Appendix D 
hereto, Record on Appeal at p. 77.] The plaintiffs, in their 
Notice of Intent to Commence a Civil Action, stated as follows: 
On November 27, 1982, Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered 
another such seizure, which resulted in more severe 
paralysis. Upon entereing Primary Children's hospi-
tal for treatment on November 27, 1982, Chris Forbes 
was informed that the the seizures and subsequent 
brain damage were probably related to fetal distress, 
hypoxia, and malpractice by the hospital and possibly 
the doctors. [Notice of Intent, Appendix B hereto, 
Record On Appeal at p. 30.] 
By advising the defendants of the date of discovery the 
plaintiffs acknowledged that the "two year" limitation period 
began to run on November 27, 1982. 
As demonstrated below, the applicable limitation period 
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in the instant case is two years from the date of discovery since 
it would expire prior to the general "four year" limitation. 
The date of alleged malpractice was between February 28, 
1981 and March 1, 1981, inclusive. As noted above, the date of 
discovery of the injury was between November 21, 1982 and 
December 1, 1982. Under the "two years from discovery" 
provision, the plaintiffs' action would be barred after November 
21, 1984. Under the "four year" provision, the plaintiffs1 
action would be barred after February 28, 1985. Clearly the 
shorter of the two periods is the "two year from discovery" 
period and therfore it is the applicable period. The "four year" 
limitation period is inapplicable and irrelevant to the case at 
bar since it would not have expired until some months after the 
expiration of the "two year from discovery" period of limitation. 
Since all the parties agree that this action was not 
commenced before the last week of November, 1984, which was the 
applicable limitation period, the sole issue presented is 
whether the provisions of §78-14-8 extended that period of 
limitation to a point sometime after the date the action was 
actually commenced, to-wit: March 12, 1985. 
Section 78-14-8 reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
Such notice shall be served within the time 
allowed for commencing a malj ractice action 
against a health care provider. If the notice 
is served less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the applicable time period, the 
time for commencing the malpractice action 
against the health care provider shall be 
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extended to 120 days from the date of service 
of notice. (Emphasis added.) [The complete 
text of §78-14-8 is set forth in Addendum A 
annexed hereto.] 
It is undisputed that the Notice of Intent to Commence 
an Action was served on all of the parties on November 20, 1984. 
As previously noted, the "applicable" limitation was going to 
expire on or about November 21, 1984, two years from the date of 
discovery of the injury. The Notice of -Intent was therefore 
served a minimum of one day prior to the expiration of the 
"applicable time period". Section 78-14-8 clearly provides that 
when the notice of intent is filed "less than 90 days prior to 
the expiration of the applicable time period...", as was done in 
the case at bar, "the time for commencing the malpractice 
action...shall be extended 120 days from the date of service of 
the notice." One hundred and twenty days from the "date of 
service of the notice" would place the applicable cut-off date at 
March 20, 1985. This action was commenced on March 12, 1985. 
The lower court, in it's Memorandum Opinion, initially 
agrees with plaintiffs1 analysis, and finds that the "two year 
from discovery" limitation period would be the first to expire, 
and the Notice of Intent was filed less than 90 days prior to 
the expiration of the Stataute of Limitations. [Memorandum 
Opinion at p. 2, Recoid on Appeal at p. 92. The entire text of 
the lower court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment is annexed 
hereto as Addendum C.) However, the lower court rejected 
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plaintiffs' argument that the filing of the Notice of Intent less 
than 90 days before that deadline extended "the time for 
commencing the malpractice action ... to 120 days from the 
service of the notice" or until March 20, 1985. The lower court 
proceeded instead to condition the unqualified extension provided 
for in §78-14-8 by concluding that any such extension must fall 
within the general "four year" limitation period of §78-14-4. 
(Memorandum Opinion at p. 2, Addendum C hereto.) In other words, 
the lower court qualified the language of §78-14-8 by ruling that 
the 120 day extension in which to commence the action would be 
cut-off or defeated if the 120 days would place the cut-off date 
beyond the general "four year" limitation of §78-14-4. 
[Memorandum Opinion at p. 2; Addendum C hereto at p. 2.) 
Needless to say the plain language of §78-14-8 contains 
no such condition, nor any other limitation. It simply states 
that if the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of 
the statute of limitations that "the time for commencing 
the...action. ..shall be extended 120 days from the date of 
service of the notice." Plaintiffs respectfully submit that 
extension is unqualified and unconditional. If §78-14-8 was 
subject to the conditions and qualifications imposed by the lower 
court plaintiffs submit the statute would have so indicated. 
It is important to recognize, before proceeding, that 
under either interpretation, the maximum amount of time a 
plaintiff could wait to file a malpractice action would be four 
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years plus the 120 days provided under §78-14-8. 
In order for the lower court to conclude, as it did, 
that this action was barred, it not only had to ignore the plain 
language of §78-14-8, it had to conclude that there was a 
conflict between the "four year" limitation period contained in 
§78-14-4 and the unqualified extension granted by §78-14-8, and 
determine that §78-14-4 controlled. 
The lower court's interpretation violates many basic 
tenets of statutory construction. 
First, the lower court unnecessarily concludes that 
there is a conflict between the two statutory provisions. Under 
plaintiffs' proposed interpretation no conflict arises because 
the "applicable" limitation period is simply determined by that 
period which would first expire. Any other limitation period 
becomes meaningless. The lower court's interpretation, however, 
essentially reimposes the "four year" limitation period if the 
Notice of Intent is served more than two years prior to the 
expiration of the "four year" limitation period. It is this 
reimposing of the "four year" limitation which creates the 
conflict with the apparently unqualified 120 day extension from 
the date of service of the notice required by §78-14-8. Such a 
tortured, complicated and confusing interpretation is simply 
unnecessary given the plain language of the statutory provisions. 
Second, in resolving the statutory conflict, the lower 
court concluded that the more general statutory provisions of 
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§78-14-4 controlled both the more recent and more specific 
statutory provisions of §78-14-8. 
This Court has consistently held that where there is a 
conflict between two statutory provisions, that provision which 
is more specific in its application governs over that which is 
more general. Millet -v- Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P2d 935, 
(1980) at 936. This tenet has full application to cases arising 
under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Id. at 936. 
Assuming, arguendo, that such a conflict exists, 
plaintiffs submit that §78-14-8 is specifically applicable to 
this case and takes precedence over the more general provisions 
of §78-14-4. Furthermore, the substance of §78-14-8 was 
specifically amended in 1979 to to avoid any conflicts with §78-
14-8. If a conflict still exists, plaintiff respectfully submits 
that the provisions of §78-14-8 control. 
Finally, the lower court's interpretation and 
application of §§78-14-4 and 78-14-8 renders portions of the 
statutes meaningless and nonsensical. 
The nonsensical interpretation given to §78-14-8 
by the lower court is best illustrated by the following 
hypothetical. 
January 1, 1983 Date of malpractice 
December 31, 1984 Date of discovery of injury 
October 4, 1986 Notice of Intent Served 
January 1, 1987 Both four year and two year 
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limitation period would 
expire absent extension 
January 2, 1987 First day could file (90 days 
notice period expires January 
1, 1987 
Under the above hypothetical, if the lower court's 
interpretation were applied, the hypothetical plaintiff would be 
precluded from filing even though the Notice of Intent was filed 
less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the two year 
period but exactly ninety days prior to the expiration of the 
four year period. The earliest the plaintiff could file any 
action requires him to wait for the ninety day notice period to 
expire. Under the hypothetical the 90 days would expire at 12:00 
midnight January 1, 1989, simultaneously with the expiration of 
the four year period. Since, under the lower court's interpreta-
tion, §78-14-4 does not extend "the time for commencing the 
malpractice action", but merely extends the two year period, the 
action would be totally barred. However, under such an interpre-
tation, if the plaintiff had delayed even one day to serve his 
Notice of Intent, he would have until January 31, 1989 in which 
to file. Given this hypothetical, the lower court's interpreta-
tion would totally prohibit the plaintiff who serves his notice 
exactly 90 days before the four year statute would run and 89 
days before the two year limitation would run from filing, but 
would grant to a plaintiff who serves his notice a day later 120 
days from the date of service. 
Such a nonsensical result is to be avoided if it can be 
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done so consistent with the statutory language. 
Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 (1977); Grant v. Utah 
State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). 
If the same hypothetical were treated under the 
plain meaning of the statute, "the time for commencing the 
malpractice action...[would]...be extended to 120 days from the 
date of the service of the notice...", or until the end of 
January, 1989. 
The defendants recognized this apparent flaw in 
their argument in the lower court and argued that rather than 
extending the entire time in which to file, §78-14-4 merely 
provides a window. [Defendants1 Memorandum, Record on Appeal at 
p. 27]. Both the lower court and the defendants fail to address 
the issue of what happens, under their interpretation, if there 
is no such window, or why, if such a window was contemplated by 
the legislature, the plain language of §78-14-8 which extends the 
time in which to file does so without limitation. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-14-4 and 78-14-8 should 
be interpreted and applied based on the plain meaning of the 
statutory languge. The plain language of §78-14-8 states that 
the "the time for commencing a malpractice action....shall be 
extended 120 days from the date of service of the notice" 
(emphasis added) if two conditions precedents are met. First, 
the plaintiff must serve a Notice of Intent on the health care 
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providers in the form prescribed. Second, service of the Notice 
of Intent is accomplished less than 90 days prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. Both of these 
conditions were met in the case at bar and therefore the statute 
of limitations ran in this case on March 20, 1985, some 8 days 
after the Complaint in this matter was filed. 
The lower court improperly limited the 120 day entension 
mandated by §78-14-8. The limitations engrafted on §78-14-8 are 
contrary to the plain language and meaning of the statute and 
contravene many tenets of statutory construction. 
Plaintiffs respectfully pray that they be given their 
day in court, and therefore request this Court to reverse the 
lower court's judgment dismissing this action and remand this 
matter to the District Court so that the claim of the plaintiffs 
can be determined on the merits of their case. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 1985. 
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78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
78-14-1. Short title of act. 
Law Reviews. 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered 
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 
Utah L. Rev. 495. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No mal-
practice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is com-
menced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrencejexcept that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that 
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall 
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence 
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; 
and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from dis-
covering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discov-
ered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minor-
ity or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and cor-
porations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against 
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior 
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under 
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may 
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law, 
but any action which under former law could have been commenced more than four 
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years 
after the effective date o( this act. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, §4, 1979, ch 128, 
s^  1 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against 
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the pro-
spective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice 
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of 
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occur-
rence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of 
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages 
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the man-
ner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons 
and complaint in a civil action or by certified maiir*return receipt requested, in 
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. fSuch 
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action 
against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior 
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the mal-
practice action against the health care pro-ider shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of noticej 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed 
as relating to the limitation on the time for-commencing any action, and shall 
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall 
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care 
provider. 




ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
261 E. BROADWAY. SUITE 150 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH Will 
Telephone 101 . 33MJOO 
November 20, 1 984 
To: Donald Van Steeter, M.D. 
1151 East 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE CIVIL ACTION 
AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDER 
Notice is hereby made, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) §78-14-8, that a civil action is to be brought 
against you on behalf of Chris Sorenson Forbes, Randy Coombs 
Forbes, and Nicole Lynn Forbes (a minor). 
GENERAL STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CLAIM 
On or about February 27, 1981, Chris Sorenson Forbes called 
Dr. Toshiko Toyota, who was Mrs. Forbes1 family doctor, and told 
Dr. Toyota that she was bleeding vaginally. Mrs. Forbes was 9 
months pregnant. Dr. Toyota, sent Mrs. Forbes to St. Marks 
Hospital, where hospital staff monitored the fetus, declared no 
distress was present and sent her home. It was negligent of the 
hospital to send her home when she was bleeding. If Dr. Toyota 
was informed of the circumstances and ratified the hospital's 
action, then Dr. Toyota was negligent also. 
On or about February 28, 1981, f,the baby stopped moving,M 
Chris Sorenson Forbes felt. She went to St. Marks Hospital 
where fetal monitoring documented severe fetal distress was 
present. Dr. Donald Van Steeter, who had been previously 
employed as an 0BGYN to deliver Mrs. Forbes in this case, Tras 
called to do a cesarean section. From the time of entering the 
hospital on February 28, until Nicole Lynn Forbes was delivered 
on March 1, was over 6 hours. The lapse in time between 
discovery of the fetal distress and the delivery of Nicole 
constituted negligence by the hospital. If Dr. Van Steeter was 
notified that the fetus was in distress but failed to appear for 
over 6 hours, he was negligent also. 
Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered a grand mal seizure, at. 11^ 
months which resulted in paralysis of her right side. ^ ~On 
November 27, 1982, Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered another such 
seizure, which resulted in more severe paralysis. Upon entering 
Primary Childrens Hospital for treatment on November 27, 1982, 
Chris Forbes was informed that the seizures and subsequent brain 
damage were probably related to fetal- distress, hypoxia, and 
malpractice by the hospital and possibly the doctors. 
Addendum B 
PERSONS INVOLVED 
Plaintiffs are Chris Sorenson Forbes and Randy Coombs 
Forbes, individually and as guardians and natural parents of 
Nicole Lynn Forbes. 
Defendants are St. Marks Hospital, Dr. Donald Van Steeter, 
M.D., Dr. Toshiko Toyota, M.D., and John Does 1 through 20 
(personnel entrusted with care). 
DATE, TIME & PLACE OF OCCURRENCE 
The incidents complained of occurred on the 27th, and 28th 
of February, and on the 1st of March, 1981. The place of 
occurrence was St. Marks Hospital, and wherever the other 
defendants may have been when and if they were negligent, the 
home of the plaintiffs, and the path of their travels to obtain 
proper health care. 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF MALPRACTICE 
These are set forth fully, above. 
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE 
PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANTS 
The defendants allowed Chris Forbes to go home when she 
should have remained under observation for her bleeding, and 
failed to timely deliver Nicole Forbes by caserean section once 
fetal distress was discovered. 
NATURE OF ALLEGED INJURIES AND OTHER DAMAGES SUSTAINED 
As a result of the negligence of the named defendants, 
Nicole Lynn Forbes has suffered brain damage and paralysis, 
resulting in her needing special speech therapy and physical 
therapy and psychiatric counseling, along with other special and 
general damages to her and her natural parents. 
I would recommend that this matter be turned over to your 
malpractice carrier in the hopes that this matter can be settled 
in a reasonable and expedient manner, and in the absence of a 
lawsuit being filed. 
Very truly yours; 
JAMES CLARK, Esq. 
JC/nbi1240-1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN; AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and : 
RANDY COOMBS FORBES, individ-
ually and as guardians and : 
natural parents of NICHOLE 
LYNN FORBES, : 
Plaintiffs, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. : CIVIL NO. C 85-1531 
ST. MARKS1S HOSPITAL, a Utah : 
corporation, DONALD VAN 
STREETER, M.D., TOSHIKO TOYOTA, : 
M.D., and JOHN DOES 1 through 
20, ' : 
Defendants. : 
Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs1 
Complaint by reason of the Statute of Limitations (78-14-4). 
This statute provides that "No malpractice action may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
... discovered the injury ... but not to exceed four years 
after the date of the alleged act ...". This seems clear 
enough and would not present any problem if it were not for 
the fact that 78-14-8 provides a notice requirement. The 
notice requirement means, (1) that no suit can be commenced 
until at least 90 days after serving the notice, (2) the notice 
can be served any time before the statute of limitations has 
run, and (3) if it is served less than 90 days before the 
Addendum C 
FORBES, ET AL V. 
ST. MARKS, ET AL. PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
statute of limitation expires it extends the time for filing 
suit for a period of 120 days from the time of the service 
of the "notice". The notice in this case would extend the 
two year statute of limitation to 3/20/85. It would not extend 
the four year period because it was not served "less than 
ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period" which this court finds to be the four year term as 
to that extension thus the four year term would expire on 
3/1/85. This issue then becomes whether or not the extension 
of the two year period to 3/20/85 takes precedence over the 
four year period expiring 3/1/85. This action was filed on 
3/12/85. This court holds that 78-14-4 intended to fix a 
definite cut off date of four years subject to an extension 
of 120 days if the notice is filed "within" 90 days prior 
to that cut off date. 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the case dismissed, 
Dated this 3 Cj day of April, 1985 
X "U-
X, 
DEAN E Jlv CONDER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies mailed to counsel ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
C**rk 
F*y '__^> ' - ^ ~ ^ ^-— ^ ^ ^ pS 'GUty 0^kr?» 
FH.EO W CLCTK** OfTICt 
SAUTLAKE COUim.UTAH 
An IB 12 35 PM *85 
BRYAN L. McDOUGAL #932 
JAMES G. CLARK #3637 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
8 East Broadway 
Suite 735, Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 
& 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and 
RANDY COOMBS FORBES individually 
and as guardians and natural 
parents of NICOLE LYNN FORBES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah 
corporation; DON VAN STEETER, 
M.D.; TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D.; and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHRIS S. FORBES 
Civil No. C-85-1531 
HON. JAMES S. SAWAYA 
CHRIS S. FORBES, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I am one of the plaintiffs in the above action. 
2. That I am the natural mother of Nicole Lynn Forbes 
and the wife of plaintiff Randy C. Forbes. 
3. That I first learned that the injury sustained by 
Nicole could be attributable to childbirth and/or the negligent-
treatment of myself and my daughter on or about November 27, 
1982. It was on that date that I was consulting medical 
4 Addendum D 
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p e r s o n n e l a t P r i m a r y C h i l d r e n ' s H o s p i t a l . 
4. Upon b e i n g a d v i s e d by P r i m a r y C h i l d r e n ' s p e r s o n n e l , 
I i n f o r m e d my h u s b a n d . To my k n o w l e d g e t h i s i s t h e f i r s t t i m e 
e i t h e r m y s e l f o r my h u s b a n d e v e n c o n s i d e r e d t h e c a u s e o f o u r 
d a u g h t e r s i n j u r y . 
DATED t h i s ^\Ti^S^Y of A p r i l , 1 9 8 5 . 
SUBSCRIB 
A p r i l , 1985 
' i s S. F o r b e s 
70RN t o b e f o r e me t h i s / 7 d a y of 
My Commission Exp R/ss ia ing i n : 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Chris S. Forbes was served this 11$ day of April, 
1985, by depositing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Carman E. Kipp, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
32 Exchange Place, Suite #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R. Keith Nelson-, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
BLM4/F0RB/AFF 
Fiup «rei*wc*s tf mi 
SALT L*KE CCUHTX.UUM 
BRYAN L. McDOUGAL #932 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
8 East Broadway 
Suite 735, Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and ] 
RANDY COOMBS FORBES individually 
and as guardians and natural 
parents of NICOLE LYNN FORBES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah 
corporation; DON VAN STEETER, ] 
M.D.; TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D.; and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
I JAMES G. CLARK 
1 Civil No. C-85-1531 
HON. JAMES S. SAWAYA 
JAMES G. CLARK, being first duly sworn upon his oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Consistent with the statutory requirements of 
§78-14-8, I mailed the Notice of Intent to Commence Civil Action 
Against Health Care Provider on November 20, 1984. 
2. The notices were sent out Certified Mail, Return 
Receipt Requested (certified nos. P-592-383-179/P-592-383-180 and 
P-592-383-181). Return receipts were received in the case of all 
three Defendants and are in the file. 
APR 18 12 3 3 ^ 8 5 
H. w*ox HiNiuer CLERK 
y t ^ i M DIM. COUtf . 
^ DErurY cteftK 
l 
Addendum E 
3. Mrs. Forbes had informed me that she discovered the 
malpractice on or about November 27, 1982. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this /7~f day of April, 1985. 
SUBSCRIB 
April, 1985. 
My Commission Exp 
Jajftes s G. Clark 
RN t o b e f o r e me t h i s / 7 day o f 
Re 
-C z&H4t& z 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of James G. Clark was served this day of April, 
1985, by depositing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Carman E. Kipp, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
32 Exchange Place, Suite #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R. Keith Nelson, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 




BRYAN L. McDOUGAL, Esq. #932 
JAMES CLARK, Esq., BAR #3637 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
261 East Broadway, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. (801) 355-1300 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and RANDY 
COOMBS FORBES individually and as 
guardians and natural parents of 
NICOLE LYNN FORBES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
ST. MARKS HOSPITAL, a Utah \ 
Corporation, DONALD VAN STEETER \ 
M.D.,. TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D., and ] 
JOHN DOES 1 through 20, ] 
Defendants. ) 
) C O M P L A I N T 
1 (Judge: 
Civil No. 
The Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, hereby 
complain and allege against the defendants as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. That all Plaintiffs and all Defendants reside in Salt 
uake County, State of Utah. 
2. That at all times relevent to this action, the Defend-
ants, and each of them, were doing business in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
3. That all the incidents complained of in this complaint 
Addendum" F" 
took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
*J. That at all times herein mentioned, Defendants Does 1 
through 20, inclusive and each of them were doctors, nurses, 
attendants, employees, assistants and consultants and the like of 
Defendants St. Marks Hospital, Dr. Toshiko Toyota, M.D., and/or 
Dr. Donald Van Steeter. 
That the true names or capacities of each of them are 
unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore, proceed against these 
Defendants by such fictitious names and will ask the Court to 
amend the complaint when the same shall have been ascertained. 
5. That at all times mentioned herein, defendant Toshiko 
Toyota, M.D., Donald Van Steeter, M.D., St. Marks Hospital, a Utah 
Corporation, and John Does 1 through 20 were the agents, servants, 
and employees, assistants and consultants of their co-defendants, 
and were, as such, acting within the course, scope and authority 
of said agency and employment and that each and every defendant as 
aforesaid, one acting as a principal, was negligent in the 
selection, hiring, and/or supervision of each and every other 
defendant as an agent, servant, employee, assistant, and/or 
consultant. 
FIRST CAUSE OP ACTION 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, allege as follows 
versus Dr. Toshiko Toyota, M.D. 
9. Sometime during the Spring of 1980, Chris Sorenson Forbes 
consulted the defendant Toshiko Toyota with reference to obtaining 
-2-
said defendant's care and treatment during her pregnancy and 
delivery of her expected child. Defendant Toyota undertook the 
care of Chris Forbes and she provided Dr. Toyota with her previous 
medical history and authorized the defendant, Toshiko Toyota, 
M.D., to obtain any needed medical records. 
10. That Dr. Toshiko Toyota, as a doctor engaged for 
compensation, owed a duty to plaintiff Chris Forbes to use due 
care in her treatment. 
11. On or about February 27, 1981, Chris Sorenson Forbes 
called Dr. Toshiko Toyota, who was Mrs. Forbes1 family doctor, and 
told Dr. Toyota that she was bleeding vaginally. Mrs. Forbes was 
9 months pregnant. Dr. Toyota told Mrs. Forbes to go to St. 
Marks Hospital. The hospital staff monitored the fetus and 
declared no distress was present. Dr. Toyota was then notified of 
the circumstances, and although Chris Forbes was still bleeding, 
she was sent home. 
11. That Dr. Toyota was negligent in the treatment and care 
of Chris Forbes in that the doctor failed to exercise or possess 
the degree of skill, standard of care, and learning ordinarily 
exercised or possessed by other such physicians practicing in 
similar localities having regard to the existing * state of 
knowledge in medicine and surgery. Said-defendant was negligent in 
the following particulars, among others: 
(a) Toshiko Toyotafs failure to recognize, t- st for, or 
diagnose that Chris Forbes was suffering from a detached placenta. 
(b) Toshiko Toyota's failure to do a "risk evaluation" or 
-3-
"stress test" on plaintiff Chris Forbes prior to delivery, or at 
the time she was sent to the hospital for vaginal bleeding. 
(c) The Defendants1 failure to keep Chris Forbes in the 
Hospital for evaluation and observation. 
(d) The Defendants1 failure to recognize the seriousness, 
urgency and cause of the complications being experienced by Chris 
Forbes. 
(e) The Defendants1 failure to recommend or order a 
cesarean section operation to remove the minor child when 
complications became apparent. 
(f) The Defendants1 failure to timely seek additional aid 
and advice from competent experts in the field of OB/GYN when 
complications became apparent. 
(g) The Defendants' failure to inform Chris Forbes of 
potential problems, the danger signs, and recommended action to 
take should the problems continue or increase. 
12. That Dr. Toyota informed the Hospital, through Nurse 
Minie, that Chris Forbes should be given a sleeping pill and sent 
home. The Hospital conveyed this information to Chris Forbes. 
13. That shortly after the above incidents, at 
approximately 9:00 p.m. on February 28, 1981 Chris Forbes 
continued to experience problems and returned to the hospital. 
The hospital, through its agents, did another fetal monitor and 
discovered "severe fetal distress." 
14. That the minor child, Nicole Lynn Forbes, was born by 
cesarean section at about 3:30 a.m. on March 1, 1981. 
-4-
15. That as a direct and proximate cause of the negligence 
of Defendant Toshiko Toyota, Plaintiff Chris Forbes has suffered 
and continues to suffer special and general damages subject to 
proof -
16. That as a direct and proximate cause of the negligence 
of Defendant Toshiko Toyota, Plaintiff Randy Coombs Forbes has 
incurred substantial medical bills, mental distress, and has 
suffered and continues to suffer special and general damages 
subject to proof. 
17. That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence 
of Defendant Toshiko Toyota, Plaintiff Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered 
Hypoxia, Anoxia, which has resulted in seizures causing paralysis, 
and brain damage. Nicole Lynn Forbes requires special speech 
therapy, physical therapy, and psychiatric counseling, and has 
suffered and continues to suffer special and general damages 
subject to proof. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, and complain and allege against 
Defendant St. Marks Hospital, a Utah Corporation, as follows: 
18. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and by this reference hereby 
incorporate all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 17 
of this Complaint. 
19. Plaintiff is informed and believes and upon such 
information and belief alleges that defendant St. Marks Hospital, 
a Utah Corporation, is authorized and licensed to conduct and did 
conduct a hospital and business or businesses in the State of 
-5-
Utah, County of Salt Lake, to which hospital or hospitals, members 
of the public were invited including the plaintiff Chris Sorenson 
Forbes . 
20. On or about the 28th day of February, 1981, Plaintiff 
Chris Forbes entered the St. Marks Hospital, a Utah Corporation. 
Plaintiff entered the hospital requesting care with regard to the 
vaginal bleeding she was experiencing in connection with her 
pregnancy. Plaintiff had received prenatal care for approx-
imately seven to nine months prior to entering said hospital by 
defendant Toshiko Toyota, M.D. 
21. On or about the 28th day of February 1981, plaintiff 
Chris Forbes consulted and engaged for compensation the services 
of defendant Toshiko Toyota, M.D., St. Marks Hospital, Donald 
Van Steeter, M.D., and John Does 1 through 20 inclusive, to 
examine, diagnose, prescribe medicines and drugs, and to care 
for and treat her process of pregnancy and child birth and to 
perform the necessary surgery or medical treatment of this or 
any other condition, if any of the same were required. 
22. That on or about the 26th day of August, 1982, and 
prior thereto, and thereafter, defendants Toshiko Toyota, M.D,, 
Donald Van Steeter, M.D., St. Marks Hospital and John does 1 
through 20 and each of them, undertook to examine, diagnose, 
prescribe medicines and drugs, handle and control the care and 
treatment of the Plaintiff, and to perform said delivery of 
plaintiff's child. 
23- That in the aforesaid examination and diagnosis of 
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Plaintiff Chris Forbes, said defendants were negligent in the 
following particulars among others: 
(a) St. Marks Hospital, as a supervisor and adminis-
trator over its staff and specifically over Toshiko Toyota, 
M.D., and Donald Van Steeter, M.D., is responsible for the 
negligent actions by said staff and doctors in the treatment and 
delivery of Pauline Vetter and Joseph Paul Vetter respectively. 
(b) St. Marks Hospital, its nurses and administration, 
are independantly negligent in failing to review, supervise, or 
consult during the treatment and methods of treatment given by 
its staff, Toshiko Toyota, M.D., and Donald Van Steeter, M.D., 
to Chris Forbes and Nicole Lynn Forbes. 
(c) St. Marks Hospital, its staff, nurses, and admin-
istration were negligent in failing to advise the proper 
hospital authorites of the impropriety and inadequacy of the 
treatment being given by Toshiko Toyota, M.D., and Donald Van 
Steeter, M.D., to Chris Forbes and Nicole Lynn Forbes, or if 
such a report was made, the hospital was negligent in the fact 
that said administration or staff supervisor failed to take 
appropriate action. 
i 
(d) St. Marks Hospital, its staff, nurses and admin-
istration are independently negligent in failing to establish 
adequate policies, statements and safeguards to prevent a staff 
member or other medical doctor to utilize nospital equipment and 
treatment methods in poor judgment or when said physician or 
staff member is not competent to operate said equipment to an 
-7-
adequate and safe degree of efficiency. 
(e) The Defendants allowed Chris Forbes to go home when 
she should have remained under observation for her bleeding, and 
failed to timely deliver Nicole Forbes by caserean section once 
fetal distress was discovered. 
(f) The Defendants were negligent in failing to conduct 
the appropriate tests, including but not limited to an ultra 
sound examination, which would have showed the problems and 
detached placenta and allowed for timely surgical or other 
preventive intervention. 
(g) The Defendants were negligent in failing to notify or 
consult with an OB/GYN specialist when Chris Forbes came into 
the hospital bleeding vaginally. 
(h) The Defendants were negligent in failing to conduct a 
meaningful or competant fetal monitor. 
(i) The Defendants were negligent in failing to give Chris 
Forbes adequate instructions for dealing with and recognizing 
problems associated with the vaginal bleeding, at the time she 
was sent home from the hospital on February 27th. 
(j) The Defendants were negligent in failing to find and 
i 
identify the cause of the vaginal bleeding. 
10. That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence 
of defendant St. Marks Hospital, a Utah Corporation, Toshiko 
Toyota, M.D., Donald Van oceeter, M.D., and John does 1 through 
20, inclusive as aforesaid, plaintiffs, Chris Sorenson Forbes, 
and Randy Coombs Forbes, individually and as the guardians and 
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natural parents of Nicole Lynn Forbes have suffered and continue 
to suffer permanent physical, mental, and emotional, and monetary 
injuries, in an amount subject to proof at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, and complain and allege as follows 
versus Donald Van Steeter, M.D.: 
25. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and by this reference hereby 
incorporate all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 24 
of this Complaint. 
26. That at approximately 9:00 p.m., on the 28th day of 
February, 1981, Plaintiff again entered the hospital, pursuant to 
Dr. Toyotafs recommendation, due to vaginal bleeding,and the—rran 
.roovomont of the bgrfry? A fetal monitor disclosed severe fetal 
distress . 
27. Dr. Donald Van Steeter, a specialist in OB/GYN, was 
called in for consultation, and the decision was made to do a 
cesarean section since labor was not progressing naturally. 
28. Dr. Donald Van Steeter, as a specialist practicing in 
the area of OB/GYN, owed a duty of due care to Plaintiff Chris 
Forbes, as his patient. 
29. Dr. Donald Van Steeter was negligent in his 'care and 
treatment of Plaintiff Chris Forbes in the following particulars, 
among others: 
(a) He failed to take or recommend action which would 
reduce the severity of the existing fetal distress. 
(b) Dr. Van Steeter was notified of the problem at approx-
-9-
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imately 10:00 p.m., but he failed to deliver the minor child 
until approximately 3:30 a.m., the following day. 
30. That as a direct and proximate cause of the negligence 
of Dr. Tan Steeter, the minor child suffered from hypoxia and 
anoxia which resulted in post partum seizures to Nicole Lynn 
Forbes. The post partum seizures caused paralysis, brain damage, 
psycological damage, emotional damage, and other special and 
general damages as shall be proved at the time of trial. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of 
Dr. Van Steeter, Plaintiffs Chris Sorenson Forbes and Randy 
Coombs Forbes individually and as the natural parents and 
guardians of Nicole Lynn Forbes have suffered and continue to 
suffer general, special, and monetary damages subject to proof at 
trial. 
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFFS PRAY for judgment against the Defend-
ants, and each of them, as follows: 
1. For general damages in an amount to be proved at trial 
pursuant to Plaintiffs1 first through third causes of action. 
2. For special damages in an amount to be proved at trial 
pursuant to Plaintiffs1 first through third causes of action. 
3. For Plaintiffs1 costs, and such other ancl further 
relief as the Court deems proper in the premises. 
DATED and signed this 7 ^ day of March, 1985. 
Plaintiffs1 Address is 
10838 Savanah Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
fj3^< 
L. McDOUGAL,/ Estfl 
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